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THE :MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE: 
ORIGINS AND JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION 
by Fredric I. Lederer• 
No man should see lww laws or sausages are made. • • 
Otto von Bismarck 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tenth anniversary of the Military Rules of Evidence is an ap-
propriate time to pause and reflect upon the rules, their implemen-
tation, and their future. In addition, enough time has passed to per-
mit a more detailed discussion of the drafting of the rules than has 
heretofore taken place.1 
*Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps (USAR); Professor of Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary in Virginia. Com· 
missioned in 1968, LTC Lederer served as a trial and defcll.S(.> COUJl.S(.>l at Fort DL~. New 
Jersey, while an excess leave officer attending Columbia University School of Law. 
Following receipt of his J.D. in 1971, he clerked for the late Frederick \'P. Bryan, United 
States District Judge for the Southern District of New York. He was then assigned 
as trial coWlSel and Courts and Boards Officer at Fort Gordon, Georgia. For the four 
years following he was a member of the criminal law faculty at The Judge Advocate 
General's School and received his LL.M. from the University of Virginia School of Law 
in 1976. From 1977-78, he was a Fulbright-Hayes research scholar in Germany, study· 
ing civilian and military European criminal law. During 1978·80 he was a member 
of the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice Working Group where he was the 
primary co-author of the Military Rules of Evidence. author of the Analysis of those 
rules, and a co-drafter of the revision to articles 2 and 3 of the UCMJ. Having resigned 
his Regular Army commission in 1980, he served as an Individual Mobilization 
Augmentee military judge at Fort Eustis until 1987 when he was assigned as Individual 
Mobilization Augmentee Deputy Commandant, The Judge Advocate General's School. 
Nothing contained in this article is necessarily the opinion of any member of the De(mt· 
ment of Defense in general or of The Judge Advocate General's School and its staff 
and faculty in particular. The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of 
Majors Lisowski and Warner; of The Judge Advocate General's School's Criminal Law 
Division, Mrs. Diane Lederer, and Mrs. Ruth Knight in reviewing and commenting on 
this article while in draft. 
• *Nat'l L.J., December 24, 1984, at 2 (quoting Bismarck). There are other English 
versions of this famous cynical observation, including "There are two thlngs that one 
should never watch in the making, one is sausage. the other is legislation." Heritage 
Foundation Reports, The Heritage Lectures; No. 144, November 20, 1987 (in this ver· 
sion, the author added his own observation, "I think that the quote docs disservice 
to sausage makers, who at least produce something that people want"). 
1The editor of the Military Law Review asked me to prepare this commemorative 
article in light of my role as co-author of the Military Rules of E\·idence. Because I 
often was not privy to the thoughts and actions of my co· authors and their relation· 
ships with the institutions they represented, aspects of this article necessarily pre-
sent my own perspective on the rules and best detail the Army's position on various 
issues. Further, because most of the records reflecting the details of the writing of 
the rules are no longer reasonably available. much of what follows necessarily stems 
from memory. Memory is, however, notoriously fragile and imperfect. Should my 
recollections prove inaccurate. I hope that those with more correct information will 
set them right. 
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Because of the diffuse nature of law reform and what is often the 
extraordinary delay between an idea for change and its adoption, 
determining with precision who should be credited with originating 
any significant legal reform is often difficult. That, however, is not 
the case with the Military Rules of Evidence. The "father" of both 
the rules and our contemporary military criminal law reform pro-
cess is Wayne Alley, who was a Colonel and the Chief of the Criminal 
Law Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the 
Army. 2 The Military Rules of Evidence owe their existence to many 
different people, 3 but the originator of the Military Rules of Evidence 
project was clearly Colonel Alley. An extraordinarily competent at-
torney, Colonel Alley not only began and initially supervised the pro-
ject, but also articulated the basic guidance to the drafters without 
which drafting would still be going on. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence were effective in 1975, and that 
same year Colonel Alley formally proposed that the military revise 
the Manual for Courts-Martial to adopt, to the extent practicable, 
the new civilian rules. 4 
IT. THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 
The necessity for the codification cannot be appreciated fully 
without an understanding of the place of the Manual for Courts-
Martial in military law. Promulgated by the President under the 
authority prescribed by Congress in article 36 of the Uniform Cod~ 
of Military Justice, 5 the Manual has the force of law and is subor-
dinate only to the Constitution, treaties, and federal statutes. 
As discussed in Trial by Court-Martial:6 
The Manual for Courts-Martial had its origins in private treatises 
such as Winthrop's 1886 Military Law and Precedents dealing 
2After promotion and service as Judge Advocate of United States Army Europl', 
then General Alley retired to assume the post of Dean of the University of Oklahoma 
School of Law, a position he left a few years later to becom(' a United States Distriet 
Judge. 
30ther individuals who have been credited with responsibility for the Military Hul('s 
of Evidence include Deanne Siemer, who was the Department of Dcf('nSl' Gl•n<•ral 
Counsel at the time of the drafting, and then Chief Judge Albert Fll'tch('r of Uw Court 
of Military Appeals. 
4Thlephone interview of Judge Wayne Alley (May 23, 1990) (hpreinaftl'r Int(•rvi(•wj. 
510 U.S.C. § 836 (1988). 
6F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Trial By Court-Martial, Criminal Procl'dure in Uw Arnt('d 
Forces§ 1-54.00 (pending 1991 publication) (unomitted footnotl's rl'numbl'rl'd). 
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with military law in the Army conte.xt.'7' In 1889, one such 
work, ''Instructions for Courts Martial and Judge Advocates,'' 
written by Captain Arthur Murray, was officially promulgated 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was expanded and published 
in 1895 as a "Manual for Courts-Martial:·tsl 
Murray's work served as the prototype of every Manual 
issued during the next 15 years (1901, 1905, 1907, 1908, 
1909, 1910). All were pocket-sized books with small type, 
similar in size and style to the many other manuals .. . . The 
Manual was published in a somewhat enlarged version in 
1917, but was not basically changed until C-olonel Wigmore 
revised it in 1921 to reflect the substantial changes in the 
Articles of War that were enacted in the previous 
year .... '9 ' A condensed edition of the Manual was 
issued in 1928 which, with minor changes, remained in 
force until 1949.1101 
As a result of the 1948 amendments to the Articles of War, a 
1949 Manual for Courts-Martial was promulgated. Soon after, 
the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice required 
the publication of the substantially revised 1951 Manual for 
Courts-Martial, which for the Ili'St time covered all of the armed 
forces. In turn, the Military Justice Act of 1968 gave rise to the 
1969 Manual for Courts-Martial .... 
Until the 1980 amendment to the 1969 Manual for Courts-
Martial, the Manuals were basically .. how to guides" coupled 
with basic hornbook type discussion and compilations of 
necessary legal information. That format, consistent with all 
of the prior Manuals, proved highly troublesome. Inasmuch as 
the President had statutory authority under article 36 to 
prescribe rules and procedures for courts-martial, the Manual 
had the force of law. It was impossible to determine, however, 
what portions of the Manual were intended to have that force. 
Much of the 1969 Manual, for example, appeared to include 
7'J'he Navy's equivalent of the Manual for Courts-Martial was Naval C.ou~ and I3oartb, 
an official publication, that was amended in 1923 and 193i. Crump, fllrt/1: .·t History 
of the Structure of Mili tary Justice in tlu.> U1zitecl States. 1921 ·1966, 17 A.F. L. Rl'\'. 
55 (1975). It appears, however, that the current Manual is dl'SCl'ndl'd dtrectly from 
the Army's publication. 
S'fhe Army Lawyer: A History of The Judge Ad\'ocal<' Gen<'ral's Co~ 1775·1975, 
94-95 (1975) (remainder of note omitted). 
9 /d. at 95·96. 
111/d. at 138. 
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numerous past decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. It was 
often impossible to tell whether the Manual meant to adopt 
those decisions as positive law or was merely setting them forth 
for the edification of the reader. This was especially true in the 
portion of the Manual setting forth evidentiary matters. The 
publication of the Military Rules of Evidence in rules format 
began the format revision designed to emphasize what is bind-
ing and what is explanatory. 
The codification of the Military Rules of Evidence thus began 
against a backdrop of an amorphous partial evidentiary codification 
that was set forth in the Manual often in hornbook fashion. Codifica-
tion therefore required determination of the origins of specific 
military evidentiary rules and their desired utility vis-a-vis the 
civilian law of evidence. 
ill. THE ORIGINS OF CODIFICATION 
The Army proposed and strongly advocated evidentiary codifica-
tion.'1 Codification was by no means unanimously supported by the 
armed services, however. The Navy, for example, opposed it.'2 In 1975, 
in what could be said to be a harbinger of things to come, a member 
of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy reported 
on a Federal Bar Association seminar about the "new" Federal Rules 
of Evidence and recommended that ''relatively low priority .. . be 
given to their quick implementation in the military.'' 13 Among other 
matters, he reasoned that the Manual for Courts-Martial already had 
''a well thought out set of rules located in one convenient place,'' 
that the new evidentiary rules would generate ''a substantial amount 
of litigation,'' that the civilian rules would have to be scrutinized and 
adapted "to any peculiarities of the military system," and that a 
"great deal of effort and expense . . . might be required in instruc-
ting each judge advocate in the field." 14 
11Judge Alley reports that General Persons, The Judge Advocate General of the Ar· 
my while Colonel Alley was chief of the Criminal Law Division, was a strong sup· 
porter of the project and essential to its success. Interview, supra note 4. 
12See supra note 4. Lack of initial Navy support did not mean lack of Naval assistam.'P 
later in the project. The Navy member on the Working Group, Commander Jim Pin· 
nell, was an extraordinarily hardworking and dedicated colleague. 
13Memorandum, William M. Trott to Code 20, JAG:204.1:WMT:1kb (17 Mar. 1975). 
14Naval recalcitrance once again surfaced in 1979. On 16 May 1979, I forwarded the 
following memorandum to The Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army: 
1. Earlier today, LCMDR Pinnell, USN, distributed copies of a mcmornn· 
dum/agenda concerning the 30 May meeting of the Joint Service Committe<.' 
on Military Justice. Originally, the meeting was to be used to begin to review 
the Working Group's product. The memo, however, five pages in length, pro· 
pounds a series of questions which in effect call the entire revision effort of 
8 
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Codification took place under the auspices of the Joint Service 
Committee on Military Justice. The process by which codification 
occurred notwithstanding opposition15 and bureaucratic inertia best 
was summed up in 1986 by then DOD General Counsel H. Lawrence 
Garrett, III:16 
The Joint Service Committee was originally established as a 
result of the problems encountered by the group that drafted 
the 1969 version of the Manual for Courts-Martial. The draft-
ing group reported that their task has been "monumental" due 
to the failure during the fifties and sixties to consider adequate-
ly many of the developments in law that occurred after issuance 
of the 1951 Manual (which implemented the new Uniform Code 
of Military Justice). An ad hoc group was formed, and a formal 
charter was signed by the services Judge Advocates General 
in 1972 assigning to the Committee responsibility for consider-
ing amendments to the UCMJ and the Manual. The chairman-
ship rotated among the services on a biennial basis, with the 
group operating primarily on the basis of consensus. 
In 1975, the chairmanship rotated to the Chief of the Army's 
Criminal Law Division, then-Colonel \Vayne Alley .... 
The original motivation for establishment of the Joint Service 
Committee-the need to keep the Manual current with devel-
the past year into question. The memo was authored by CMDR Ed Byrnt', Chief 
of Criminal Law of the Navy, and represents his personal views rather than those 
of the Navy TJAG. He is the Chairman of the Joint Service Committe-e. 
2. Chief Judge Fletche~; acquainted with the memo by Bob Mueller of the Work· 
ing Group, joined our meeting to voice his strong concern O\'er what he viewed 
as a possible attempt to "scuttle" the evidence project . . .. 
3. . . . At present, this is hopefully a minor matter that may be rcsol\'cd without 
great effort. However, it does provide the possibility of a major confrontation 
with DOD General Counsel and the Court of Military Appeals on one side and 
the Navy (and possibly the Air Force as well) on the other ... 
Memorandum, Major Fredric Lederer to Major General Law~nce Williams, subject: 
Revision of the Rules of Evidence (16 l\lay 1979). 
1S0ne can only speculate as to why most lawmakers choose to proceed witlt or ~frnin 
from law refonn. Absent a pressing visible need for change, usually the ~fonnt'rs' 
claim of future improvement in the Jaw is countered by claims of contemporary legal 
adequacy and needless expense. In actual fact, one can argue that most people ~ 
inherently comfortable with the status quo and ~luctant to change. particularly if 
they have invested great personal effort in the thing to be changed. ThiS is oftt'n 
summed up by the old adage, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Unfortunately, the adage 
discourages improving a product or process assumed to be adequate: \\'(' would prob-
ably still be living in caves if we took it seriously. 
16Garrett, Rejlections on Contemporary Sources of Military LaiL', Tite Anny Lawyer, 
Feb. 1987, at 38, 39-40. 
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opments in the law-was a matter of particular concern to Colo-
nel Alley. In January, 1975, President Ford signed legislation 
establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence, which contained 
reforms greatly simplifying trial of criminal and civil cases. 
Other changes in federal criminal law, particularly as a result 
of Supreme Court decisions, also created the potential for 
parallel changes in the Manual and the Code. In view of article 
36, UCMJ, which generally requires us to follow federal criminal 
rules of evidence and procedure to the extent practicable and 
not inconsistent with the Code, Alley believed a vigorous and 
systematic review effort was necessary to comply with the 
Code. 
Despite these opportunities, Colonel Alley found his chair-
manship to be a source of frustration rather than reward. In 
the absence of a crisis, the requirement for consensus proved 
to be a powerful disincentive to developing the level of effort 
on a joint service basis necessary to produce reform proposals. 
By late 1977, little had been accomplished. At that time, 
however, one of my predecessors, Deanne Siemer, developed an 
interest in military justice and asked a member of our staff to 
meet with the services to assess the legislative process. Colonel 
Alley readily seized on this chance to break the logjam. He 
recommended that an effort be initiated to adopt the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, with appropriate modifications, into the 
Manual for Courts-Martial. Alley suggested that the project 
would serve three separate goals: 
first, it would meet the Article 36 requirement that we 
generally apply federal rules; second, it was a discrete pro-
ject that could be accomplished with one year's concerted 
effort, establishing a pattern of work that the Joint Ser-
vice Committee could carry into the future; and third, the 
efficiencies in trial practice generated by the new rules 
would demonstrate to the services the benefits of serious 
attention to law reform on a sustained basis. 
Colonel Alley's initiative was adopted by the General Counsel 
who established the Evidence Project as a DOD requirement 
and placed a member of our staff on the working groupP 
Drafting began in early 1978. Ms. Siemer forwarded the final draft 
l1Jd. 
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to the Office of Management and Budget on September 12, 1979.18 
Colonel Alley had been optimistic; codification took somewhat longer 
than the year he had predicted. Despite the complexity of the pro-
cess and service disagreement,l9 the project was a success, and on 
March 12, 1980, the President issued an executive order amending 
the Manual for Courts-Martial and promulgating the Military Rules 
of Evidence, effective 1 September 1980.20 
IV. THE FORMAL CODIFICATION 
STRUCTURE 
The Joint Service Committee on Military Justice Working Group 
drafted the Military Rules of Evidence. The Working Group "was 
composed of two representatives from the staff of the Court of 
Military Appeals, and one representative from the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Coast Guard, and Office of the General Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Defense, respectively. The Marine Corps did not participate 
at the drafting level."21 The \Vorking Group was responsible to the 
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, which then was com-
posed of the chief of the criminal law branch of each of the Armed 
Forces, including the Marine Corps, and one representative each from 
the Office of the DOD General Counsel and the Court of I\filitary Ap-
peals.22 Although the Joint Service Committee was the supervisory 
agency and reviewed the rules, its role in the codification proved to 
be relatively minor;23 most disputes were resolved within the Work-
ing Group or outside the formal codification structure. 
Article 67(g) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice2"' creates the 
"Code Committee," a body composed of The Judge Advocate General 
of each of the Armed Forces, the Director of the Marine Judge Ad-
18DOD E.O. Doc. 241 (September 12, 1979). 
198~ e.g., infra note 43 and accompanying te.xt. 
20Exec. Order No. 12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (1980). 
21Lederer, The Military Rules of Et•idelzce: An Ot~rt•icw, 12 The Advocat<.> 113, ll.J 
(1980). The Working Group members who drafted the rules were CommandL>r Jim Pm· 
nell (Navy), Major Fredric Lederer (Anny), M3jor James Potuk (Air Fort'L>), Ueuten· 
ant Commander Thm Snook (Coast Guard), Mr. Robert MuellL>r (Court of ~tilitary Ap· 
peals), Ms. Carol Scott (Court of Military Appeals), and Mr. Andrew Effron (DOD GenL>rnl 
Counsel). 
22'fhe Joint Service Committee representatives of these institutions abo S<.>n·l'd on 
the Working Group. 
23'fhis is not to minimize the importance of the Joint Sen•ice Commttt~. It spent 
a significant amount of time reviewing the rules and madt' a numbt'r of tmportant 
decisions in the process. 
24Unifonn Code of Military Justice, art. 67(g), 10 li.S.C. § 867(g) (19SH) [heretnaftt'r 
UCMJ). 
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vocate Division, and the judges of the Court of Military Appeals. 26 
The Code Committee met once to resolve several minor interservice 
conflicts. 26 
The final draft of the Military Rules of Evidence ''was forwarded 
through the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to the 
Office of Management and Budget, which circulated the rules to the 
Department of Justice and other agencies, and finally forwarded 
them to the President via the White House Counsel's office."27 
This sterile description of the "chain of command" fails to impart 
an accurate picture of how the rules actually were drafted and 
approved-a picture that only can be viewed via a detailed rendi-
tion of the actual codification process. 
V. CODIFICATION BEGINS 
The Working Group began its activities in early 1978. Because I 
did not join it until approximately August 1978,28 I lack first hand 
knowledge of its early activities. Clearly, the Working Group had 
begun the drafting process. I believe, however, that it had not gone 
into "high speed operation" primarily because higher authority in-
itially had failed to supply it with adequate guidance. 
The most important question faced by the Working Group was the 
definition of its mission. Although the Working Group's charter was 
to draft new evidentiary rules using the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as its basis, the scope of its task was unclear. Were the Federal Rules 
of Evidence to be adopted verbatim, modified slightly, or used simply 
as a point of departure? Given the option, each member of the Work-
ing Group, for example, preferred to modify substantially, if not to 
redraft entirely, at least one of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 20 Draft-
25Th the best of my knowledge, the Coast Guard General Counsel participated on 
behalf of the Coast Guard. 
260ne such conflict concerned whether to retain Rules 407, 408, 409, and 411 because 
of their civil application. 
27Lederer, supra note 21, at 113, 114. 
28Replacing then Major John Bozeman. 
29lt was apparent to the Working Group that a number of the Federal Hules of 
Evidence badly needed clarification. Although Fed. R. Evid. 607 permits impeaeh· 
ment of a party's own witness, for example, Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) permits impeach· 
ment by "prior bad acts" only on cross-examination, "slippage" that is questionable. 
More important was Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2)'s limitation on impeachment by prior con· 
viction to convictions involving "dishonesty or false statement." It was clear that 
"dishonesty" was dangerously misleading. See, e.g., Memorandum, Fred Lederer to 
the Evidence Committee, subject: Commentary to the Military Rules of Evidence 6 
(7 Feb. 1979). 
12 
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ing appeared to be an interminable process when Colonel Alley gave 
the Working Group the "marching orders .. that made the project 
possible. He instructed the Working Group that it was to adopt each 
Federal Rule of Evidence verbatim, making only the necessary word-
ing changes needed to apply it to military procedure. unless a 
substantial articulated military necessity for its revision existed, or, 
put differently, unless the civilian rule would be unworkable within 
the armed forces without change. 
Colonel Alley's instructions not only made pragmatic sense, they 
incorporated a fundamental philosophical position: military eviden-
tiary law should be as similar to civilian law as possible. Military 
evidentiary law as found in the Manual for Courts-Martial had begun 
as nearly identical with prevailing civilian federal law, 30 in part due 
to the efforts of Professor Wigmore, author of the 1921 revision. 
Nevertheless, the process of incorporation of case rulings without 
periodic systemic revision had created a wide gap between civilian 
and military practice in some areas, a gap that the advent of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence broadened considerably. Colonel Alley in-
tended not just that the codification reflect the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, but that allfuture military evidentiary law echo it as well, 
unless a valid military reason existed for departing from it.31 
Although generally dispositive, 32 Colonel Alley's instructions left 
open several major policy questions. One was raised in the debate 
over adoption of Rule 201, Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts. Com-
mander Pinnell argued most strongly that the distinction between 
30Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 
The [first] Manual contained no formal discussion of evidence and only a few 
brief notes on credibility, competency and proof of intent. The author advised 
that the court should follow as far as possible the evidentiary rules of tlte criminal 
courts of the United States-but that since members were not ven;cd in legal 
science they should not be overly concerned with technicalities. 
The Army Lawyer: A History of The Judge Advocate Genernl's Corps. 1775·1975, 95 
(1975). 
31This was ensured by Mil. R. Evid. 1102, which provides for the automatic adop-
tion of amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence unless the President instructs 
othenvise. 
32\Vhat was .. unworkable" or not "practicable" in article 36 terms wm. a frequent 
subject of debate. Arguing that they were unnecessary and thus not mandated, the 
court representative, for example, objected to modifying Rules 803 and 80-1to preserve 
previously articulated hearsay exceptions (and to expand them to laboratory reports 
and chain of custody receipts) as well as to alter Rule 902 to include military atte5ta· 
tion certificates. Similarly, the Air Force objected to revising Rule 110'~ to provide the 
President six months before an amendment to the Federnl Rules of Evidence 
automatically applied to the Armed Forces. Occasionally, altemativl' "'te5ts"' were 
argued. The Air Force opposed Rule 507, Political Vote. on the grounds that it was 
unnecessary and ridiculous. Post Joint Service C~mmittee summary submitted to Col· 
onel Wayne Hansen (July 1979). 
13 
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adjudicative and legislative facts in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
was so unintelligible and confusing as to make it unworkable in the 
military context. Although persuasive in the context of Rule 201, 
redrafting it would have set a precedent that would have permitted 
substantial alterations in otherwise acceptable rules. 33 Ultimately, a.J 
the Working Group decided that although Federal Rule 201 was either 
poorly written or unduly sophisticated, it was workable. 35 We 
therefore adopted it, 36 mooting the general philosophical debate. 
A less significant question concerned rules primarily of applica-
tion to civil cases. The Navy initially opposed retention of Rules 407 
(Subsequent Remedial Measures), 408 (Compromise and Offer to 
Compromise), 409 (Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses) and 
411 (Liability Insurance) on the grounds of irrelevancy. Although 
clearly the original intent of most if not all of these rules applied 
solely to civil cases,37 they were not necessarily inapplicable to 
33My internal report on the matter read: 
(Federal] Rule 201(a) allows judicial notice of adjudicative facts only [,) attemp-
ting to distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts. The distinction 
is a difficult one, even for the author of the concept. Accordingly, thl' Navy 
representative moved to eliminate the word, "adjudicative" leaving only th<' 
word "facts." This precipitated a major argument as [to] the Group's purpose 
with the Air Force and COMA members stating that their intent was to adopt 
the Rules without modification except as required by military operations. The 
Navy member argued that it was ridiculous to adopt a rule that is poorly drafted 
and which can be improved (in this case, most of the States have refused to 
adopt the specific rule). CPT Effron of DOD took an intermediate position agree-
ing that if a Rule would cause so much confusion as to render it virtually useless, 
it should be modified. Discussion of this specific Rule was deferred pending 
further study as to its accepted interpretation in the civilian courts. The general 
philosophical debate has, however, importance beyond the specific rule and 
represents a continuing clash between the representatives. While I would agreP 
with the Navy's position personally, it seems clear that too much work has bPl'n 
done to reasonably push that position. Consequently, my position at present 
is that we must adopt the specific Federal Rule unless it is either contra to 
military law (to be interpreted rather widely) or is so poorly drafted as to makP 
its adoption almost an exercise in futility .... 
Memorandum, Fed. R. Evid. Working Group Meeting, from MAJ Fredric Lederer to 
COL Doug Clause, para. I.e. (1 Sept. 1978). 
34This occurred following a meeting of members of the Working Group with Pro-
fessor Steve Saltzburg, University of Virginia School of Law, and a personal meeting 
with Professor Edward Imwinkelried, then of the University of San Diego Law School. 
Memorandum, Fred Lederer to the Evidence Committee, subject: Commentary to thl' 
Military Rules of Evidence (7 Feb. 1979). 
35Cf. id. at 2. 
36The Working Group did, however, draft a unique Rule 201A, Judicial Notic(• of 
Law, to clarify matters ordinarily dealt with in the civilian courts by Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 26.1. Mil. R. Evid. 201A analysis at A22-4. 
31See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 409: "Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to 
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by any i(\jury is not admissibl(• 
to prove liability for the i(\jury.'' 
14 
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criminal cases, particularly considering military offenses based on 
negligence. In rmal voting at the Joint Service Committee, on May 
30, 1979, the Air Force opposed Rule 408; and the Navy, Air Force, 
and Marine Corps opposed Rules 409 and 411. The Joint Service Com-
mittee adopted Rule 408 and sent Rules 409 and 411 to the Code Com-
mittee, which adopted them. 
Two major policy questions remained: 1) whether to codify 
privilege rules; and 2) whether to codify the law of search and 
seizure, interrogation, and eyewitness identification. 
Although the draft Federal Rules of Evidence had included privi-
lege rules, they proved highly controversial, and Congress elected 
to proceed without them. 38 The Manual for Courts-Martial, however, 
had a comprehensive body of these rules. The Working Group readi-
ly decided that because many military personnel were stationed in 
places where they did not have easy access to legal advice, accessibili-
ty and certainty required the adoption of specific privilege rules. 39 
The "constitutional" issues proved more comple..x. Although deter-
mining what constituted academic comment and what was positive 
law in the area was particularly difficult, the Manual's evidentiary 
chapter extended to search and seizure, interrogation, and eye-
witness identification as well as to more traditional evidentiary 
topics. Not only did the Federal Rules of Evidence fail to address 
these matters, no other codification had either. 40 To the extent that 
these matters were of importance, they could have been placed in 
the planned procedural revision of the Manual. 41 Although that 
would not have been unreasonable, it was undesirable if only because 
the "constitutional"42 portion of the Manual governed matters of 
enormous importance that occurred daily throughout the armed 
forces and that customarily were dealt with by nonlawyers. After 
debate, the Working Group elected to codify the area, albeit in a very 
careful fashion that codified some issues43 while leaving others to 
case law development. The drafters' intent was clear and plain: the 
new rules were to function as positive law rather than as a useless 
38This left only Fed. R. Evid. 501 recognizing and establishing a federal common 
law of privileges. 
39See infra text accompanying notes 80-82 (discussion of the prl\'ilcge rules). 
40'!b date, no other jurisdiction has codified these topics. 
41That revision ultimately produced the Rules for Courts-Martial. 
42'fhis is, of course, somewhat of a misnomer as interrogation is go\·emed as well 
by UC.MJ art. 31. 
43'fhe issues that were codified were those that dealt with matter.; such as searches 
and inspections, normally handled by nonlawycrs. 
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summary of what the drafters thought the current law to be.44 The 
decision to codify remained controversial, however, and, at the last 
possible moment, the Air Force attempted to ''missile'' the search 
and seizure codification. 45 
44The contrary position, see, e.g., United States v. Postle, 20 M.J. 632 (N.M.C.M.R. 
1985), is difficult to understand. The President has power to create rules of both 
evidence and procedure under article 36, augmented by his constitutional authority 
as Commander in Chief. Clearly, the President may limit the government's action in 
these areas (as distinguished from expanding it beyond the limits imposed by the Con· 
stitution or statute): 
Normal rules of statutory construction provide that the highest source authority 
will be paramount unless a lower source creates rules that are constitutional 
and provide greater rights for the individual. As applied to the Military Rules 
of Evidence, if a section III search rule is more restrictive of government con· 
duct than Supreme Court constitutional interpretation, then the military should 
be bound by the more restrictive, constitutional, subordinate rule. It follows 
then that military trial and appellate courts should not be free to ignore the 
Military Rules of Evidence and adopt reasonableness as the standard for assess· 
ing fourth amendment conduct. 
Gilligan & Smith, Supreme Court-19891lmn, Part II, The Army Lawyer, May 1990, 
at 85, 89 (calling into question the value of codifying "constitutional rules"). 
The careful crafting of the rules makes it apparent, even if one ignored all other 
evidence of intent, that some rules were to be absolutely binding while others wen• 
to use case precedent. See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 314 (k). Th argue that the constitutional 
codification was simply declarative of then existing law is to ignore the intent and 
structure of the rules and to defy common sense. The Working Group assumed that 
desirable Supreme Court case law changes would be adopted through amendment 
of the rules, a process that has in fact worked handily. See generally infra text ac-
companying notes 118-144. 
450n 30 July 1979, Brigadier General Th.ylor, Acting The Judge Advocate General 
of the Air Force, wrote to Major General Harvey, The Judge Advocate General of thl' 
Army, expressing his concern over the codification of search and seizure noting that 
the rules would impact "on the present and future state of discipline, readiness and 
command authority." General Harvey responded briefly, endorsing the rules. Subse· 
quently, the Department of the Air Force nonconcurred with that part of the rules. 
Memorandum, Colonel Carl R. Abrams, Office of Legislative Liaison, for Director, 
Legislative Reference Service, DOD General Counsel (30 Aug. 1979). In relevant part, 
page two of this memo stated: 
16 
The Department of the Air Force nonconcurs with rules 311-317, which 
establishes rules governing search and seizure in trials by courts-martial, for 
the following reasons: 
(1) In many cases, the rules purport to overrule United States Court of 
Military Appeals decisions which are based on constitutional principles. 
Adoption of these rules may create disorder, in that the court, since the 
decisions were based on constitutional principles, will no doubt invalidate 
those provisions of the Manual. 
(2) The rules establish concrete rules of law governing searches and 
seizures. In the military environment, search and seizure is a very fluid 
area of the law. It may well be that we should, as the Federal Courts have 
done, leave interpretation to the courts. In addition, because this area 
of the law is so fluid, we may be bound by rules in the Manual which 
are more restrictive than those advanced by the Supreme Court. 
We recognize, however, that at least four of the rules (311, 312, 315 and 317) 
which provide procedural guidance to the field could be useful and extremely 
beneficial to both judge advocates and nonlawyers. We could support the rctl'n· 
tion of those rules. Further we also could support many of the other rules, but 
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The actual initial codification process was simple. Individual 
members of the Working Group took responsibility for specific areas 
or rules, prepared drafts, and circulated them. The Working Group 
would then meet and debate policy and text. Particularly in the lat-
ter part of the phase, meetings were held at the Court of Military 
Appeals, away from the usual demands of the telephone. 
By intent, each member of the Working Group represented an 
armed force or other institution and was the primary liaison with 
that institution. 46 What differed radically was the nature of the rela-
tionship between the Working Group representative and the institu-
tion represented. Commander Pinnell, responsible to Captain Ed 
Byrne, briefed Navy JAG flag officers periodically and circulated rules 
drafts throughout the Navy JAG Corps. The Army functioned quite 
differently. Although General Persons, The Judge Advocate General 
of the Army when Colonel Alley created the codification project, 
showed a great deal of interest in it, subsequent general officer super-
vision within the Army was virtually absent. 47 Circulation of the pro-
posed rules within the Army similarly was limited; The Judge Ad-
vocate General's School,48 members of the judiciary, and government 
only after careful evaluation and redraft. 
Interestingly, aspects of this futile effort are contradictory. Only on~ rul~ arguably 
extended the power of the government-Rule 313(b), Inspections. All th~ others were 
within the clear parameters of case law. Yet, the memo confid~ntly predicted action 
by the Court of Military Appeals to "overrule" the rules while, at th~ sam~ tim~. it 
expressed concern that the Air Force might be bound by rules more restrictive than 
necessary. At the same time that the Air Fore~ obj~tro to tlte search and seizure 
rules, it failed to mount a broadside attack on the confession and int~rrogation rules, 
301-306. 
The Court of Military Appeals has invalidated only on~ of Ute constitutional rules: 
the part of Mil. R. Evid. 315( d)(2) that permitted a commander to delegate th~ power 
to authorize searches, United States v. Kalscheur, 11 M.J. 373 (C.M.A. 1981), and Its 
unprecedented holding nullified a rule that did nothing more than to restate prior 
law. It has, however, periodically ignored them. See Gilligmz & Smilll, Suprt"'mt• 
Court-1989 7lmn, Part II, The Army Lawyer, May 1990, at 85 n.45. 
Mter the decision was made to promulgate the rules, the Army, Na\'y, Marin~ Corps. 
and Coast Guard participated in a worldwide training program conducted by tlten Com· 
rnander Jim Pinnell and Major Fred Lederer. With the e.xception of one installation 
in Colorado Springs, however, the Air Force chose not to participate. Although no con· 
nection between the above memo and the Air Fbrce boycott ever was made, on~ must 
wonder whether a connection actually did e.xist. 
460ne exception to this general rule was that th~ Navy representati\'e, Commander 
Pinnell, represented the Marine Corps as well as th~ Na\•y. 
471)uring the drafting phase, I reported regularly to Colonel James Clause, Chi~f. 
Criminal Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, for whom 
I worked. Generally speaking, Colonel Clause eitller concurred in my positions or per· 
mitted me substantial discretion. Soon after the rules were in ncar final form, Colo-
nel Clause was reassigned to tlle Army Court of Military ~view and replaced by th~n 
Colonel, now Brigadier General, Wayne Hansen. 
48'fhe Judge Advocate General"s School Criminal Law Oi\'ision supplied se,·~n pages 
of thoughtful and detailed comments, a number of which led to altemtions of th~ rules. 
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and defense appellate counsel received drafts and were asked to com-
ment. The various members of the Working Group held differing 
degrees of independence.49 To the best of my knowledge, however, 
these differences had virtually no effect on debate within the Com-
mittee. 50 
Because the Working Group members were institutional represen-
tatives, the Working Group's decisions tended to be final, and few 
matters required formal consideration at higher levels. The Joint Ser-
vice Committee did meet to resolve several interservice disputes, 61 
and the Code Committee met once to discuss the rules. 52 
After a final official coordination from the Department of Defense 
General Counsel's office, 53 the Working Group forwarded the rules 
to the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, and 
49 Among the armed forces representatives, I held the largest degn'e of individual 
discretion. Colonel Clause directed me to draft a hearsay exception for laboratory 
reports, Mil. R. Evid. 803(6) & (8), and not to attempt to modify Mil. H. Evicl. ()]fi. 
Otherwise I was permitted nearly unlimited independencC'. 
50Despite occasional efforts of the Navy representativC' to bring to bC'ar thC' allC'~Wd 
unified position of senior Navy leadership. Of course, the Working Group was dC'C'ply 
concerned about the political feasibility of its changes. In this regard. although lw 
was not technically chair of the committee, Andrew Effron hC'ld what usually was 
viewed as final authority because the DOD GenC'ral Counsel dC'tC'rminC'd thC' natun• 
of the final draft that would leave the Pentagon. A great deal is owC'd to Mr. Effron 
for his extraordinary efforts to ensure completion of the rulC's in a form of whkh all 
could be proud. 
510ne of my "favorite" memories of the Joint Service CommittC'C' com·C'rncd tht• draft 
of Rule 321, Eyewitness Identification. In light of the potentially substantial <·hnngC's 
made in the Rule. I had recommended that the Analysis contain a suggC'stion that 
prior to an attempted government identification of the accus<'d, defensC' counsel <·ould 
ask the trial judge for permission to seat the accused in thC' gallC'ry. A mC'mb<>r of tlw 
Committee-not the Army representative I hasten to add-exclaimC'd in shock, "You 
know we can't do that, we'd never get any identifications." 
52'fhe most important decision made by the Code CommitteC' conc('rnt•d tht• applka-
tion of former testimony to courts-martial, artide 32 investigations, and similar pro-
ceedings. Unfortunately, its resolution of this issue creatC'd morP troublP than it solwd. 
See infra text accompanying notes 74-79. 
~J'fhe coordination process proved to be quite instructive. It o<TUrrC'd, with a "short 
fuse," after a number of members of the Working Group had bC't'n givC'n lNlW with 
the express knowledge of, and presumed implicit consent of, thC' DOD General Counst•l's 
Office. It was apparent that the DOD General Counsel did not wish thC' servk<•s to 
challenge the circulated draft, particularly changes that had bC'C'n madC' in lwr of-
fice. The services responded to the DOD draft with numC'rous propost•d <·orn•ctions. 
These ranged from a request to restore proposed RuiC' 412A, l'~rC'sh Complaint, through 
objection to changing the judge's duty to advisC' an apparC'ntly uninformC'd witn('ss 
of his or her self-incrimination rights from "should advise" to "may advise," to a protC'st 
at the omission of "anus or vagina" and the substitution thereof of "other body 
cavities" in Rule 312(c), Intrusion into Body Cavities. Memorandum, MG ClausC'n, Ac-
ting Army TJAG, for General Counsel, DOD, 23 July 1979, subject: DOD Draft of tlu• 
Military Rules of Evidence (14 Aug. 1979). 
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the Office of Management and Budget for coordination. After minor 
changes in response to comments by the Department of Justice, the 
Working Group sent the rules to the White House for the President's 
signature. 
After the Working Group !mished preparing the rules, the Drafters' 
Analysis was written. For each new rule, the Analysis was to con-
tain its origin, the changes it made in military law, and, as ap-
propriate, practice commentary. I wrote the Analysis, and the Work-
ing Group and the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice 
reviewed and edited it. Concurrent with the concluding portion of 
the rules project, Commander Pinnell and I traveled around the world 
presenting on-site instruction for Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and 
Marine personnel. 54 
VI. SELECTED RULES 
Although space does not permit a detailed review of each of the 
rules, discussion of the origin of some of the rules is illustrative of 
the rule-making process and perhaps of independent interest. 
A. PRESUMPTIONS 
Article ITI of the Federal Rules of Evidence codifies in Rule :301 
the Thayer ''burst the bubble'' form of presumption66 for presump-
tions not otherwise defined by statute or case law. Although the 
Manual dealt with presumptions to some degree, presumptions were 
not codified as part of the rules. Instead, Section III was used for 
the codification of the law of search and seizure, interrogation, and 
eyewitness identification. Th the best of my memory, presumptions 
were not codified, not because of their inherent difficulty and com-
plexity, 56 but rather because members of the Working Group failed 
to understand fully their importance. Instead, the Working Group 
quickly accepted the decision of the framers of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence not to codify presumptions in criminal cases and refused 
to adopt Federal Rule 301 because of its application to civil cases. 57 
54The Air Force did not participate. See supra note 45. 
5S'fhis shifts only the burden of production (also called tlt<.> burdl.'n of gomg fono.-ard). 
Once an adequate antount of evidence is introduced to counter the presuml'd fact, 
the "bubble bursts" and the presumption vanishes. It is named after Profcs.orTimyer. 
56ln lieu of Fed. R. Evid. 301, states have often adopted, for <.>xample, th<' ~(organ 
true rebuttable presumption, which shifts the burden of proof ru. w<.>ll as the burden 
of production. Still more difficult in light of tlte Bill of Right.!> are presumpttoru. an 
criminal cases. Compare Fed. R. Evid., art. III, with Uniform Hult'S of Evtdence. an. Ill. 
571 believe that the primary proponent of noncodifi<."dtion wru. Mr. Effron, who may 
well have understood entirely the law and issues in\'ol\'ed-soml.'tlting I surely did not. 
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In retrospect, the omission of presumptions from the Military Rules 
of Evidence seems inconsequential and fully in keeping with the goal 
of ensuring that military evidentiary law remains as similar to civilian 
evidentiary law as possible. At the same time, adoption of a presump-
tion rule applicable to criminal cases might have been of value to 
judges and counsel. 
B. PLEAS, PLEA BARGAINING, AND 
OATHS DURING PROVIDENCY 
The Working Group had no problem adopting Federal Rule of 
Evidence 410, which protected the plea bargaining process. The 
drafters were concerned with the unique nature of the military pro-
cedure that permits an attempt to resign ''for the good of the ser-
vice'' and expanded the rule to protect against statements submit-
ted as part of such an attempt. 58 
There was debate as to whether an accused pleading guilty should 
be examined under oath during the providency inquiry. Commander 
Pinnell argued strenuously that the oath requirement was necessary 
to protect the integrity of the plea and to avoid pretrial agreements 
by innocent accused. I maintained that an innocent accused willing 
to plead guilty to obtain a plea bargain was not likely to be deterred 
from doing so by the oath, which simply would add to the coercive 
nature of the criminal justice system. In its original form, Rule 410 
was promulgated without a requirement that the providency inquiry 
be conducted under oath. That requirement, however, was added 
as part of the Rules for Courts-Martial. 59 
C. THE RAPE SHIELD RULE; 
FRESH COMPLAINT 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 presented special problems. Under 
military law as it then existed, evidence of lack of chastity of a rape 
victim or of sexual relations outside marriage was admissible for im-
peachment and to establish consent. It was apparent that the usual 
form of this evidence was irrelevant, psychologically damaging to 
58The drafters were concerned with formal procedures that required a confessional 
request for an administrative discharge. We did not discuss, nor did we intend to reach, 
the type of conduct that the Court of Military Appeals subsequently has protected 
via Rule 410. See, e.g., United States v. Brabant, 29 M.J. 259, 263-64 (C.M.A. 1989); 
United States v. Barunas, 23 M.J. 71 (C.M.A. 1986). 
~9R.C.M. 910 (e). Commander Pinnell had declared his intent to adopt the oath re-
quirement at the first opportunity. The change illustrates the importance of the in-
dividuals assigned to drafting duty. 
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many complainants, and often was given unwarranted value by fact-
!mders. The question was, however, what to do about the situation. 
Given its attempt to limit sharply evidence relating to a victim's 
past sexual history, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 seemed an unduly 
complex rule with significant constitutional difficulties. The rule 
itself is an unusual one. Outside of the District of Columbia, limited 
federal criminal jurisdiction provides that most rape cases are tried 
in state courts. Viewed objectively and without concern for individual 
bias or political implications, 60 Rule 412 was unnecessary. Basic prin-
ciples of logical relevance coupled with Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
should have been sufficient, and a proposal was made not to adopt 
Rule 412 in favor of a more general statement of the application of 
the principle of relevancy. Ms. Siemer, DOD General Counsel, rejected 
that position, and the Working Group adopted Rule 412. 
Having decided (or directed) to adopt the federal rape shield rule, 
the Working Group was left with several important details. The Group 
quickly deleted the civilian rule's requirement that the proponent 
of evidence covered by the rule give I1.fteen days notice of proffer 
because it might unnecessarily delay trials. More important, the 
Working Group considered Rule 412 to be both too limited and too 
expansive. It was too limited because of its focus only on rape, and 
accordingly, the Group expanded Military Rule of Evidence 412 to 
include other offenses such as sodomy. 61 
It was, however, also too expansive in its provision that evidence 
of past reputation or opinion of the character of a victim be per se 
inadmissible. One can create hypotheticals in which such evidence, 
offered by the defense, would be constitutionally necessary for a fair 
trial. Under normal circumstances, the constitutional guarantees 
would supersede an evidentiary rule, and the evidence would be ad-
mitted. Rule 412 is a highly unusual rule, however, and a different 
600f course, Rule 412 was an important symbol for thest' very reasons, and it was 
evident that, given past military law, it was essential that some form of dear break 
with the past be demonstrated. 
61At Colonel Alley's request, the Army proposed an additional scctton that would 
have admitted "past sexual behavior as a prostitute" if there were other evidence 
of consent, evidence that the alleged sexual act was performed by tlte \'ictim for pay· 
ment, and evidence that "the complaint of the nonconsensual se.'\*Ual offeJlS(.> was made 
by the victim as a result of subsequent dispute concerning payment for the sexual 
act." Colonel Alley had found that the Army in Europe had a number of C'ruiCS in which 
prostitutes had alleged rape following disagreement on tlte proper remwteration. Tite 
additional section would have clarified Rule 412's application to this situation. Thl' 
other services, however, unanimously rejected it. Post Joint Scn·it-e Committee sum· 
mary suBmitted to Colonel Wayne Hansen (July 1979). 
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result can apply. The rule provides that if its procedural requirements 
are met, otherwise barred evidence, other than opinion or reputa-
tion evidence, may be admitted when constitutionally required. 62 The 
plain meaning of the rule is that reputation or opinion evidence is 
never admissible. Accordingly, the defense is estopped from using 
it, and if a fair trial demands its use, the only remedy is to abate 
the trial or to dismiss the charges. This somewhat abnormal situa-
tion makes perfect sense considering the legislative history of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 412, which includes concern that complainants not 
be psychologically il\iured by improper cross-examination. Although 
the Working Group believed that concern to be substantial, it felt 
that dismissal of charges would not be in the best interests of socie-
ty or the complainant, and the Group preferred to remove the ab-
solute language from Rule 412(a). The Working Group's sole female 
member strongly objected, and the Navy concurred in her objection. 
As a result, we decided to place our intent in the Analysis rather 
than the rule. 63 
A collateral consequence of the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was the elimination of the specific Manual declaration of 
admissibility of evidence of fresh complaint. Considering the number 
of sex offenses that occur in the armed forces, members of the Work-
ing Group preferred to codify "fresh complaint"-which in the 
military had been broad enough to include the identity of the offen-
der64-and to preserve it in the military rules. The military members 
of the Joint Service Committee65 unanimously approved the policy 
decision, and we drafted proposed Rule 412A, Fresh Complaint Con-
cerning a Sexual Offense. Ms. Siemer overruled the attempt to re-
tain fresh complaint evidence. 66 Accordingly, the present rules per-
62See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 14 M.J. 856 (A.C.M.R. 1982). 
63Accordingly, we attempted for political reasons to preserve our intent via the 
"legislative history" rather than modifying the rule itself. 
64MCM, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 142c. 
65Voting Sheet, Joint Service Committee on Military Justice (30 May 1979) (policy 
decision). The Court Representative objected to inclusion of the proposed Rule 412A 
on the grounds that it was not within the Federal Rules of Evidence and that fresh 
complaint evidence was not probative. Post Joint Service Committee summary sub-
mitted to Colonel Wayne Hansen (July 1979). 
66During final coordination, the Army responded officially: "The Rules omit any 
explicit reference to fresh complaint. Specific recognition of this exception to the hear-
say rule should be included in the Rules. The omission of a specific fresh complaint 
is of significant concern to the Department of the Army." Memorandum for General 
Counsel Department of Defense (Attn: Director, Legislative Reference Service) Pro-
posed Executive Order "Prescribing Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1969 (Revised Edition)" (5 Aug. 1979). In a memorandum directly to 
the DOD General Counsel, General Clausen wrote: 
Recommend Rule 412A (Fresh Complaint) be restored. The omission of the topic 
from the Federal Rules reflects only the minimal number of cases involving sex-
ual assaults in the Article III courts and is apparently an ov('rsight. Its omis-
22 
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mit fresh complaint evidence on the merits only when admissible 
under Rule 80l(d)(l)(B) as a prior consistent statement when the com-
plainant is alleged to have fabricated his or her testimony or when 
admissible as an ''excited utterance' '67 or other hearsay exception. 68 
D. BIAS IMPEACHMENT 
The Federal Rules of Evidence failed to codify bias impeachment. 
In one sense, this was eminently reasonable given the impeachment 
structure of those rules. Because the basic impeachment rule is one 
of logical relevance under Rules 401 and 402, the drafters codified 
only those areas that departed from the concept-most notably those 
rules that limited admissibility. It seemed clear to me that although 
the federal approach might be analytically sound, it might prove 
highly troublesome in military practice. The Manual for Courts-
Martial not only had a bias impeachment rule, but also expressly per-
mitted the use of extrinsic evidence. Absent a similar provision in 
the Military Rules of Evidence, litigation over this essential fonn of 
impeachment was probable. Accordingly, bias was codified as Rule 
608( c), a national model. 69 
sion from the Military Rules will result in the exclusion of e\·idence of fresh 
complaint in all but those few cases which would come within tlte very Umited 
relevant exceptions to the hearsay rule. Evidence of fresh complaint, or lack 
thereof, is probative and valuable. Considering the unfortunately large number 
of se>...-ual assault cases common to the armed forces, the rule is clearly needed. 
Evidence of fresh complaint does not involve any of tlte detrimental factors 
that led to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, and there appeaci to be no socjaJ or 
political justification for its omission. 
Memorandum, MG Clausen, Army Acting TJAG, for General C{)unsel, DOD, 23 July 
1979, subject: DOD Draft of the Military Rules of Evidence (14 Aug. 1979). The Air 
Force agreed with this position, stating: 
Although there is no comparable rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Air 
Force strongly recommends the inclusion of 412A in the military rules. Apparent· 
ly, it was not included in the Federal Rules due to oversight or a general belief 
that the infrequent trial of sa-ual offenses in Federal C{)urts negated its necessi· 
ty. Most states have adopted some concept of the • • fresh complaint·· doctrine. 
and the Code Committee approved the insertion of this rule in tltc military rules. 
Memorandum for General Counsel Department of Defense (ATTN: Director, Legislative 
Reference Service) DID E.O. Doc. 241, Proposed Executive Order "Prescribing Amend-
ments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Re;\·ised Edition)" (AFU 
4664) (30 Aug. 1979). 
67See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 14 M.J. 845 (A.C.M.R. 1982). 
68Somewhat ironically, despite my enthusiasm for a fresh complaint rule during draft· 
ing, I have concluded that fresh complaint is neither justified nor necessary. It is hnrd 
to defend the doctrine when declaring as irrelevant a "fresh complaint" of a nonsex· 
ual offense, such as robbery. 
69Interestingly, despite general acceptance in the federal district courts, the ques· 
tion of whether bias was permitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence had to be 
resolved by the Supreme Court in 1984. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). 
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E. THE HEARSAY RULE-
LABORATORY REPORTS 
[Vol. 130 
Drug prosecutions were (and are) a m~or component of military 
criminal legal practice. At the time the Military Rules of Evidence 
were written, a fair degree of litigation time had been devoted to 
the admissibility of forensic laboratory reports in courts-martial. 
Given the confrontation clause, there was strong reason to doubt that 
these records had the type of reliability that justified their admis-
sion. As a practical matter, however, the abolition of these reports 
was considered unacceptable by the services, and express exceptions 
for laboratory reports and chains of custody were incorporated into 
Rules 803(6) and (8) along with a list of othenvise acceptable 
documents then listed as hearsay exceptions in the Manual. 70 
F. THE HEARSAY RULE-
ARTICLE 82 TESTIMONY 
Although the Military Rules of Evidence contain several drafting 
errors, 71 the provision for use of prior article 32 testimony is one of 
the worst. 72 Under the 1969 Manual, article 32 investigation testi-
mony could be offered at trial by court-martial if the declarant was 
unavailable and the prior testimony had been under oath, subject 
to cross-examination, and recorded on a verbatim record. Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b )(1), however, provides that a hearsay excep-
tion exists for testimony of an unavailable declarant when it is: 
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same 
or a different proceeding or in a deposition taken in compliance 
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if 
the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had 
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
70I drafted the laboratory exceptions at the direction of Colonel Clause. See b-upra 
note 47. I added the exception for chain of custody documents for reasons of con· 
sistency and because I believed that they were in fact proper business records. A lit· 
tle noticed aspect of chain of custody forms is, however, that they usually do not pro-
vide space for reports of the condition of the material being transferred and thus ure 
not relevant on the issue of condition or contamination. The court representative op· 
posed the changes on the grounds that they were not in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and inadequate military necessity existed for them. Post Joint Service Committee sum· 
mary submitted to Colonel Wayne Hansen (July 1979). 
71See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 3U(g)(2). In adopting Franks v. Delaware, 422 U.S. 928 (1978), 
the rule refers to "the allegation of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." The 
rule should have used "perjury" or "intentional misstatement" instead of "falsity." 
72I drafted it. 
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The focus of the federal rule is on the motivation of the declarant 
at the earlier proceeding. The 1969 Manual provision did not include 
motive. \Vhen drafted, Military Rule of Evidence 804(b )(2) attemp-
ted to adopt the federal rule while retaining the original Manual rule 
for military proceedings, including article 32 investigations. 
Thstimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same 
or different proceeding or in a deposition taken in compliance 
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if 
the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. A record of testimony 
given before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commis-
sions, other military tribunals, and before proceedings pursuant 
to or equivalent to those required by Article 32 is admissible 
under this subdivision if such a record is a verbatim record. . .. 
The text of the rule technically was sufficient because the second 
sentence set forth a special and distinct rule for military proceedings. 
Notwithstanding this, some could argue that it is unclear from the 
text whether the second sentence, dealing with unique military pro-
ceedings, stands alone or is governed by the similar motive rule in 
the rrrst sentence. 
The exception was one of the few rules to be discussed at length 
by the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. The Marine 
representative questioned the way the military provision had been 
grafted onto the basic civilian rule. Distracted by other business, I 
failed to recognize fully the implications of the ta't, and I convinced 
the Committee to rely on the Analysis. 73 This was done badly by any 
73! subsequently reported: 
The Marine Corps has objected to one aspect of Rule 804 . . . . Subdivision (b )(1) 
[Former Thstimony] was modified in committee to make testimony given at 
courts-martial, Article 32 proceedings, or their equivalents admissible when 
a verbatim record is made of the proceedings. This language was a result of 
the requirement in the Federal Rule that the party against whom the testimony 
is being offered have had a "similar motive" at the first proceeding to develop 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. The Committee is unanimous 
(with the probable exception of the Court Representative) that Article 32 
testimony et al. should be admissible as former testimony pur.mant to the 
modification. The difficulty lies in the draftsmanship. It is presumed that the 
Marine Corps would support specific language in the Rule making it clear that 
the "similar motive" language is not relevant, but the Court would probably 
object. The Navy is willing to resolve the issue via the Analysis but the Marines 
may object. Either solution should be acceptable to us. The problem is com-
plicated by the USCMA recognition that Article 32's were intended to be 
discovery devices by Congress. Hence, there is a valid argument that specific 
language in the Rule would be inappropriate. Present law, however, allows use 
of Article 32 testimony as former testimony when a verbatim record has been 
made. 
Post Joint Service Committee summary submitted to C.olonel Wayne Ha.nscn (July 1979). 
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standard. It became fatal, however, when the issue was sent to the 
Code Committee for resolution, and the Code Committee determin-
ed that, without amending the rule, it wished both sentences to be 
read together, thus requiring proof of similar motive and a verbatim 
record for article 32 and similar hearings. 74 The Analysis reflects the 
Code Committee's intent in that regard: ''The Rule is explicitly in-
tended to prohibit use of testimony at an Article 32 hearing unless 
the requisite similar motive was present during the hearing.' '76 The 
final irony occurred when the Court of Military Appeals decided the 
question of how to interpret the rule, the judges having participated 
in the decision that merged the two provisions into one. Having 
previously decided that discovery was not ''a prime object of the 
pretrial investigation,''76 in UnitedStatesv. Conner11 Judges Everett 
and Cox dispensed with the Analysis and held: 
[A]s we interpret the requirement of 'similar motive,' if the 
defense counsel has been allowed to cross-examine the govern-
ment witness without restriction on the scope of cross-
examination, then the provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) and 
of the Sixth Amendment are satisfied even if that opportunity 
is not used, and the testimony can later be admitted at trial. 78 
As a consequence, the court accepted the similar motive test and 
then gutted it by rendering it meaningless. 79 All this could have been 
avoided by a minor redraft of the rule. 
G. PRIVILEGES 
Given the Working Group's mandate to adopt the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to the extent practicable, the drafters were limited in their 
creativity. Because the Federal Rules of Evidence lack specific 
privilege rules, however, the normal limitation did not apply to 
codification of privileges. The military privilege rules were taken in 
part from the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial and the proposed but 
unenacted Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with privileges, and 
were written partially from scratch. 
74From an academic standpoint, the Code Committee's decision was eminently 
reasonable, and, I now think, correct. The failure to modify Rule 804(b)(l) to express-
ly state the Code Committee's intent, however, was a major error that led first to un-
necessary confusion and litigation and then to its nullification. 
7~Mil. R. Evid. 804 analysis at A22-51. 
76United States v. Arruza, 26 M.J. 234 (C.M.A. 1988) (citing United States v. Eggers, 
11 C.M.R. 191, 194 (1953)) (emphasis added). 
7727 M.J. 378, 387-90 (C.M.A. 1989). 
78/d. at 389. 
79Concurring in the result, Judge Sullivan wrote of "the majority opinion's eviscera· 
tion of Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(I)." /d. at 392. 
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Andy Effron drafted the privilege rules. Although all the privilege 
rules were done well, his genius shines through in Military Rule of 
Evidence 501. A hybrid masterpiece, 80 the rule provides both for 
codified individual privileges and for those privileges ·'generally 
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts." As a result, military law has a body of specific privileges 
and may adopt other new privileges that are accepted by the federal 
district courts. Codification of privileges is inherently difficult given 
the major policy questions and the fear of preventing growth in the 
law to adjust to new situations. Military Rule of Evidence 501 is an 
ideal compromise between total, rigid, codification and abandonment 
of the effort in favor of a case law approach. 
Space prohibits a detailed review of the privilege rules, but it may 
suffice to note that the codification is one of the most completeK1 
and useful in the nation. 82 
H. 1'HE CONSTITUTIONAL CODIFICATION 
IN GENERAL 
The Section m rules are unique in the United States and are a com-
promise between the military's need for ftxed rules with stability and 
certainty and the lawyer's desire for case-by-case adjudication and 
change. They are binding because they either accurately codify ex-
isting constitutional case law or are more favorable to the accused 
than case law prescribes. Except insofar as individual provisions in-
tentionally leave matters "free to float" with case law, they were 
intended to be absolutely binding on all personnel and were to be 
altered solely by amendment. 83 
\Vhen drafting the search and seizure and interrogation rules.""* I 
attempted to use the following guidelines: 
80\Vhich the ABA Section on Criminal Justice Committee on Hull'S of EvtdL•nce and 
Criminal Procedure has adopted as a preferred alternative to tlte presenl Federal rule. 
s•And arguably one of the best. 
82S~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 505, Classified Information. One of Ute most untbual provt· 
sions found in the rules is Mil. R. 5ll(b), which I believe I drafted intually Titat rule 
provides in part that the transmission of otherwise privileged infommtion by telephonl' 
remains privileged even if overheard in a predictable fashion. lntendl'<l to n-cogmze 
modem life. particularly in the armed forces witlt communications morutonng. the 
rule is a unique recognition of social changes due to tl'<'hnology. 
83But see infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussingjudictal abrogatton and 
indifference). 
84Mr. Effron drafted the eyewitness identification rules and collabomtl'd on ~hi. R. 
Evid. 313(b), Inspections. 
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1. Procedural rules should be binding and should be spelled out 
in detail. 85 
2. Areas of the law that are of importance only to lawyers or-
dinarily should be left to case law development. 86 
3. Areas of law that are of importance to nonlawyers should be 
codified in a binding fashion and should be spelled out in 
detail. 87 Change should be through amendment of the rules. 
4. If the answer to a legal question is unclear and we are unable 
to resolve it by policy decision, no answer should be codified;88 
applicable Supreme Court language should be used, however 
unclear;89 or, as complete an answer as is accurate should be 
given, with the remainder of the question left to case law. 00 
5. When desirable, room should be left for unanticipated major 
changes in the law. 01 
Although one could disagree with any given provision, one would 
have thought that taken as a whole the structure would have ad-
dressed adequately all legitimate concerns about ''over codification,'' 
limiting the development of the law, or supplying "inadequate 
guidance to the field.'' That it did not92 for many critics may be more 
of a comment on the common law orientation of American lawyers, 
or on the hubris of judges, than an indication of inadequacy. 
I. INTERROGATIONS-NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
Within the Working Group one of the more controversial provisions 
was the notice to counsel rule-Military Rule of Evidence 
85Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 301, 311. 
86Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 31l(a)(2) ("the accused would otherwise have grounds to 
object to the search or seizure under the Constitution"); Mil. R. Evid. 3ll(c)(l) (a search 
or seizure is unlawful if "in violation of the Constitution of the United States as ap· 
plied to members of the armed forces"). 
s1See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 314. 
sssee, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 305(c). 
89Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 301(d) ("except when there is a real danger of further self· 
incrimination"); Mil. R. Evid. 314(f)(1) ("criminal activity may be afoot"). 
90Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 305(0 ("if a person chooses to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination or the right to counsel under this rule, questioning must cease lm· 
mediately"). At the time this was written, the impact of asserting the right to couns<•l 
was unclear. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 
U.S. 675 {1988), came later. The rule specified what was known-that interrogation 
had to stop, but left open and to case law the question of resumption. 
91Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 314(k) (other searches). 
92See infra text accompanying notes 118-44. 
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305(e)93-which implemented the decision of the Court of Military 
Appeals in United States v . .AfcOmbe?-94 in an effort to ensure that 
interrogators did not nullify a represented suspect's right to counsel. 
The Navy representative strongly opposed the rule and forecast dire 
consequences if it were adopted,95 while the Air Force attempted 
to limit its reach.96 The rule was adopted and, contrary to the ex-
pressed fears, apparently has proven neither unworkable nor con-
troversial. 97 
J. SEARCH AND SEIZURE-BODILY VIEWS 
AND INSPECTIONS 9s 
When originally drafted, Military Rule of Evidence 312 dealt 
primarily with strip and intrusive body searches. As such, it was to 
the best of my knowledge the first binding rule of its type in the na-
tion and, insofar as that aspect is concerned, it has held up quite 
well. Neither Rule 312 nor Rule 313(b), Inspections, however, dealt 
adequately with urinalysis-primarily because they were not in-
tended to do so. 
When the rule was drafted, the services' general policy was to 
locate drug abusers and either treat them or discharge them using 
a medical justification. Military Rule of Evidence 312(0. Intrusions 
for Medical Diagnosis, was an ''open sesame'' designed to permit 
urinalysis or other procedures for valid medical reasons. 99 When lrrst 
the Navy and then the other services abandoned in whole or in part 
the medical justification for urinalysis,100 the Rule 312(0 "escape 
clause" lost its utility. 
93"\Vhen a person subject to the Code who is required to give wamin8,!> under sub-
division (c) intends to question an accused or person suspected of an offense and know:. 
or reasonably should know that counsel either has been appointed for or retained 
by the accused or suspect with respect to that offense, Lhl' cout\Sl'l must be noufied 
of the intended interrogation and given a reasonabh.• timl' in whadt to anend before 
the interrogation may proceed:· 
941 M.J. 380 (C . .M.A. 1976). 
95As well as promising repeal at the earliest possible moment. 
96'fhe Air Force wished to eliminate that part of the notkl' requarement that ap-
plied when the interrogator "reasonably should know·· that counsel had been ob-
tained. Memorandum for General Counsel Department of Dl'fense (Ann: Dln'Ctor, 
Legislative Reference Service) DID E.O. Doc. 241. Proposed Exl'<.'utivl' Ordl'r "Prescnb-
ing Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (HevlS{>d Eda· 
tion)" (AFLI 4664) 2 (30 Aug. 1979). 
97 At the same time, the rule has bolstered the protection afforded military J>(.'P>On · 
nel from the type of implicit coercion potentially found in the military em·tronml'nt. 
98Now amended to read "Body vie\\'S and intrusions." Sec i7t(ra text accompanytng 
notes 122-25. 
99See .Mil. R. Evid. 312(0 analysis of A22-19. 
1oosee, e.g., Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 77 (C.M.A. 1983) (eating "Tltl' l'arlucca 
Memorandum," a December 28, 1981, DOD memorandum issued by Ik>puty Secretary 
of Defense Carlucci allowing • 'evidence obtained by compulsory urinalyslS to lx> used 
for disciplinary action"). 
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Inherent in this discussion is the assumption that Military Rule of 
Evidence 312 was intended to apply to urinalysis and forcible ex-
traction of bodily fluids. When the rule was revised concurrently with 
the promulgation of the Rules for Courts-Martial, however, Military 
Rule of Evidence 312( d)'s title was changed from "Seizure of Bodily 
Fluids" to "Extraction of Body Fluids." The change in title was need-
ed because the subsection "does not apply to compulsory produc-
tion of body fluids (e.g., being ordered to void urine), but rather to 
physical extraction of body fluids (e.g., catheterization or withdrawal 
of blood),"101 an analysis concurred in by the Court of Military Ap-
peals.102 This was erroneous; the rule always was intended to apply 
to urinalysis outside the scope of the medical exception in Rule 312(0. 
That is why the section was entitled ''seizure.'' That the rule was 
not drafted well for this purpose, however, is apparent.l03 
K. SEARCH AND SEIZURE-INSPECTIONS 
Arguably, the most important aspect of the "constitutional" 
codification was Rule 313(b), Inspections. It is the only rule express-
ly issued by the President using his authority as Commander in 
Chief!04 Unlike the other rules, it is the only rule intended to regulate 
directly day-to-day nonlaw enforcement activities of the armed 
forces. 
To be understood, Rule 313(b) must be placed in context. When 
the drafting project began, it did so against the backdrop of a major 
worldwide drug abuse problem and an activist Court of Military Ap-
peals without a unified theory of inspections,105 a court that was 
hostile to prosecutions based on inspections for drugs. Judge Perry 
in particular viewed drug possession and sale as ''evidence of 
crime'' 106 and could not accept an inspection for drugs as a proper 
administrative inspection.107 His view seemed mistaken as drug use 
rendered successful military operations impossible; drugs-like 
unlawful weapons-seemed a fundamental aspect of the health, 
welfare, and operational readiness of the armed forces. The eourt 's 
101Mil. R. Evid. 312 analysis at A22-19. 
102Murray, 16 M.J. at 77. 
103As a consequence Mil. R. Evid. :31:J(b) was subsequently amended to stat<• that, 
"(a]n order to produce body fluids, such as urine, is permissible in accordam'(' with 
this Rule." Although this resolves the urinalysis "inspection" issue, it leaves op('n an 
order to produce urine incident to a probable cause seizure. 
104Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-20. 
105See, e.g. , United States v. Thomas, 1 M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 1976). 
106United States v. Roberts, 2 M .. J. 31, 36 (C.M.A. 1976). 
107'fhe court changed its perspective in United States v. Middleton, 10 M .. J. 12!3 (C.M.A. 
1981). 
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holdings, therefore, seriously threatened readiness. At the same time, 
we had the perception that some commanders were perjuring 
themselves during suppression motions by testifying that they were 
conducting traditional "health and welfare" inspections when they 
were really looking for drugs. Such conduct was clearly horrendous 
and unacceptable. 
Accordingly, Rule 313(b) was drafted to realign the concept of 
"health and welfare inspections,"108 and it stated e.xplicitly that "(a]n 
inspection also includes an examination to locate and confiscate 
unlawful weapons and other contraband when such property would 
affect adversely the security, military fitness, or good order and 
discipline of the command." The rule assumed, for example, that 
there was some form of reasonable expectation of privacy in one's 
belongings in a barracks,109 but that the military's interest in 
readiness, as well as the individual's interest in a secure and safe 
environment, justified inspection for drugs when that inspection was 
not intended as a subterfuge for a search of an individual. When 
viewed against the backdrop of the drug problem, Rule 313(b) had 
enormous consequence and potentially permitted near carte blan-
che authority to inspect in some badly troubled commands. That 
result seemed fully appropriate when the usually minimal e.xpecta-
tion of privacy was viewed against the administrative need. 
Rule 313(b) subsequently was amended. Among other changes, us-
ing the decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States 
v. Middleton,no the drafters deleted the requirement for "a case-by-
case showing of the adverse effects of weapons or contraband (in-
cluding controlled substances) in the particular unit, organization, 
installation, aircraft, or vehicle exarnined." 111 The rule thus assumes 
that drugs (included within the definition of contraband) are suffi-
ciently adverse to military readiness and the like to permit ad-
ministrative inspections. It shifts the primary focus to prohibiting 
subterfuge searches intended for prosecutorial purposes. The drafters 
of the amendments acted in an appellate legal environment far more 
favorable to inspections for drugs than we did. 
Contemporary civilian case law112 suggests that even the present 
tollSee generally Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-20-A22-24. 
109"fhe rule, however, also applied to all other locations including on post quart~r.>. 
11010 M.J. 123 (C.M.A. 1981) (Middleton was not based, however. on Rule 313(b)). 
111See Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-23. 
112S~ e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 15 li.S.L.\\'. 4781 (U.S. Jun~ 14, 
1990); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Skin· 
ner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Cf. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868 (1987); New .Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (198S). 
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Rule 313(b) may be more conservative than needed. The rule retains 
the distinction between an administrative inspection and an examina-
tion intended to locate evidence for prosecutorial purposes. Major 
Pat Lisowski113 has suggested that many commanders would testify, 
if they could, that they see little distinction for readiness purposes 
between inspecting for drugs to rid the unit of them114 and looking 
for offenders to prosecute to deter others. In civilian life, the war 
against drugs poses agonizing choices between personal privacy and 
liberty on the one hand, and our strong desire to eliminate drug traf-
ficking and use on the other. Presumably, however, the fourth amend-
ment provides some basic reservoir of privacy for civilians that can-
not be altered despite public desire. It is by no means clear that the 
fourth amendment need function similarly in the armed forces. 
When Rule 313(b) initially was drafted, it was apparent that there 
was a reasonable legal argument that inspections were simply not 
''searches'' within the scope of the fourth amendment. The Analysis 
states in part: "Consequently, although the fourth amendment is ap-
plicable to members of the Armed Forces, inspections may not be 
'searches' within the meaning of the fourth amendment by reason 
of history, necessity, and constitutional interpretation."115 Although 
I find it troubling, at least in its attempted application to civilian life, 
I believe that the doctrine of original intent readily could be used 
to remove all military inspections-whatever their intent-from 
fourth amendment regulation.116 This would permit inspections with 
prosecutorial purposes, although arguably it would prohibit a subter-
fuge inspection intended solely to obtain evidence against a single 
individual. 
Although it may be that reappraisal of the application of the fourth 
amendment to military inspections117 would yield significantly greater 
command freedom-freedom sustainable by the United States 
Supreme Court-it is not clear that increasing command flexibility 
in this manner is desirable as a policy matter. Implementation of such 
113The outgoing search and seizure expert from the Criminal Law Division of The 
Judge Advocate General's School. 
1140r to forestall their appearance. 
w>Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-20. 
116The same result might follow from an assumption that there is a de minimis ex· 
pectation of privacy throughout the armed forces. I think, however, that various 
reasonable expectations do in fact exist and would hesitate to rewrite Rule 313(b) on 
that basis. 
117Because of the structure of the Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 313(b) would have 
to first be amended before such a change could be effective. Of course, the Court of 
Military Appeals first could endorse such an approach in dictum. 
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a change might send a signal to personnel at all levels that might 
significantly impair morale and thus might entail an unreasonable 
socio-political cost. 
Vll. THE RULES IN ACTION-
JUDICIAL RESISTANCE 
In a common law system based on precedent, a new statute 
presents a new starting point. Unless the constitutionality of the 
statute is called into question, the statute is valid and must be ap-
plied. As cases are presented to the courts, the courts interpret the 
statute and, through case law precedent, often alter the statute's 
meaning in the process. Certainly, the court may interpret the text 
in a fashion inconsistent with its historical intent.l18 Should the 
legislative authorities disagree with the judicial interpretation, they 
are free to revise the statute and reinitiate the process of interpreta-
tion. This description of the common law process is known to and 
is accepted by all Anglo-American lawyers and often is taken for 
granted by them. It is thus the same process that we expected to 
11BThe Court of Military Appeals has done this, for e:~arnplc, in the area of character 
evidence. Like its federal counterpart, Military Rule of Evidence 404(a){l) pcnnit.s 
the accused to offer on the merits "evidence of a pertinent trait of the character of 
the accused." The analysis to the rule states, "It is the intention of the c~mmittce, 
however, to allow the defense to introduce evidence of good military character when 
that specific trait is pertinent. Evidence of good military character would be admissi· 
ble, for example, in a prosecution for disobedience of orders." Mil. R. Evid. 404 analysis 
at A22-32. Interpreting the rule, however, the court has gone well beyond the limited 
use intended by the drafters. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 28 M.J. 48,49 n.l (C.M.A. 
1989). See generally Smith, Military Rule of E1.'idi?11Cl' 4(}!j(a)(J): An Urt.Sltcci'S.'i[ul .4l· 
tempt to Limit the Introduction of Character Evide11ce on t11e Merits, 33 Fed. B. News 
& J. 429 (1986) ("An analysis of these cases leads to a conclusion that the drafter.>' 
intent behind Mil. R. Evid. 404(aXl) to limit the nature of admissible character evidence 
has been all but ignored-and that the interests of justice have been better served 
as a result") Id. at 430. 
Clearly the text of a rule is the primary source of law. In one of my fir.>t cases as 
a military judge after drafting the rules, I was faced with an eyewitness idcnUfica· 
tion suppression motion brought under Rule 321. After argument by counsel, I fell 
constrained to apply the rule as explicitly written even though its analysis suggested 
a different outcome. Although I think it proper to consult legislative history to inter· 
pret a statute or rule, if the .. plain meaning" is susceptible of only one intcrpreta· 
tion, I believe that interpretation to be binding. 
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apply once the Military Rules of Evidence were promulgated.tw We 
did not expect the degree of judicial resistance that took place.' 20 
Although most courts in the armed forces, at all levels, have ap-
plied the rules routinely and have dealt with them as one would ex-
pect, that has not always been the case. The actions of the Court 
of Military Appeals have been particularly disturbing given its role 
as the "Supreme Court of the Armed Forces." The court has shown 
a surprising and alarming willingness to ignore and twist the rules,121 
especially the "constitutional" rules. 
Although trivial, one of the earliest harbingers of the court's at-
titude may be United States v. Armstrong.122 A pre-rules case, Ann-
strong examined the application of the article 31 right against self-
incrimination to a blood test of a suspected drunk driver convicted 
of involuntary manslaughter. In discussing article 3l(b), Chief Judge 
Everett referred to "body fluids" 123 and then, via a lengthy ex-
planatory footnote,l24 stated: "Although Mil. R. Evid. 312(d) uses the 
term 'bodily fluids,' we choose to employ the words 'body fluids,' 
. . . . '' Although strictly speaking, the court did not use its own ter-
minology in lieu of the rule's,125 it signaled its willingness to substitute 
its own preferences for those promulgated by the President. 
119lt may be that United States v. Alleyne, 13 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 1982), is an illustrntive 
case. Faced with the refusal of a soldier to permit an exit examination of personal 
property when he was leaving a United States installation in Korea, the property WllS 
seized and searched yielding evidence of theft. After deciding that civilian case law 
permitted exit customs searches, the court briefly referred to Mil. R. Evid. 314(c) and, 
noting that the rule, 
seems to limit overseas gate searches to occasions of entry. Since such 
a distinction would be at odds with the rationale for border searches and 
with the precedents on the subject-and since the Rule docs not pur-
port specifically to preclude the exit search-we are unwilling in this in-
stance to fmd a negative implication in the authority granted by the Rule 
to make entry searches. 
13 M.J. at 335. One could argue that if the search were not authorized by Rule 314 
in some particular, including the 314(k) new type of search "escape clause," it would 
be unlawful. One could read the court's opinion, however, as interpreting Rule 314(c) 
implicitly to permit exit searches through poor drafting. Although I know this to be 
erroneous given my knowledge of the original intent of the provision (which considen•d 
the interests in protecting against improper entry of property to be different from 
those associated with exits), it is the type of thing one might expect an American 
court to do within the scope of the "game" of statutory interpretation. 
12°Concededly, the rules are not statutes themselves but they were promulgated by 
the President under both statutory authority, UCMJ art. 36, and his inherent authority 
as Commander in Chief; thus, they have the force of law. 
121At least "twisting" rules is sometimes part of the "interpretation game." Ignor-
ing rules is an entirely different matter. 
1229 M.J. 374 (1980). 
123Jd. at 378. 
t24Jd. n.5. 
125Rule 312 subsequently was amended to use "body" fluids, and the court's first 
review of the rule properly addressed the new, and preferred, terminology. 
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Far more worrisome was the court's statement in J'tllllTay v. 
Haldeman:126 "However, it is not necessary-or even profitable-to 
try to fit compulsory urinalysis within the specific terms of that rule. 
We have made clear that a search may be reasonable even though 
it does not fit neatly into a category specifically authorized by a 
Military Rule of Evidence.''127 This was error. Military Rule of 
Evidence 314(k) recognizes new types of searches approved via case 
law; it is quite clearly not a "near miss" rule. As the court is bound 
by the rules, either a search is authorized by them or it is unlawful-
unless it is a new type under Rule 314(k). 
Having set the stage, the court then proceeded to an un-
precedented form of judicial sleight of hand in United Slates v. Tip-
ton.128 Tipton involved the reliability of an informant who supplied 
information that ultimately resulted in the apprehension of the ac-
cused. The unanimous court discussed and applied the Supreme 
Court's Illinois v. Gates129 decision, which abrogated the 
Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong130 test for probable cause to search. The 
court did this notwithstanding the fact that Aguilm1Spinelli was 
written into Military Rules of Evidence 315(f)(2) and 316(d).l31 Amaz-
ingly, the Tipton opinion fails even to cite the Military Rules of Evi-
dence. The court had no problem, however, discussing Rule :31:3(c), 
Inventory, in United States v. Dulus,132 a case decided less than one 
month after Tipton. In Dulus the court used, and perhaps "stretch-
ed," the rule to justify an "inventory" search of an airman's 
automobile after his apprehension and confmement. 
The Court of Military Appeals was not the only offender during 
this period. In 1982, the Air Force Court of Military Review, discuss-
ing Rule 614(b)'s requirement that questions of a witness by court 
members be submitted in writing, referred to "the procedure sug-
gested'' by the rule and disparaged itP3 
126!6 .M.J. 74 (C . .M.A. 1983). 
127Jd. at 82. The opinion continues: 
Compulsory urinalysis under the circumstances of thl' preSl'nt case is jusufied 
by the same considerations that pennit health and welfare inspections. 
Therefore, we conclude that the draftsmen of thl' Rull's did not tntl'nd to in· 
validate that procedure sub silentio by their failure to authorire it spcctfirnlly. 
Indeed, Mil. R. Evid. 314(k) makes this very point . /d. 
12816 M.J. 283 (C.M.A. 1983). 
129462 u.s. 213 (1983). 
130'fhe two prongs of this test are 1) reliability and 2) basis in fact. 
131Compare Tipton with United Statl's v. Bollerud, 16 M.J. 761 (A .C.~t.R. 19s:J) 
(holding that the Military Rules preempted applirntion of Gat~·s) . 
13216 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1983). 
133United States v. Miller, 14 M.J. 924, 926 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (emphasiS added). 
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In 1984, Chief Judge Everett invited me to address the annual 
Homer Ferguson Conference on the topic of the Military Rules of 
Evidence. I spokel34 on rules compliance and quite bluntly asserted 
that Tipton in particular compelled the conclusion that the Court 
of Military Appeals was either incompetent or lawless. In fact, in-
competence was impossible, at least in the sense of ignorance of the 
rule's existence. After all, one of the drafters of the rules, Mr. Robert 
Mueller, a highly competent and responsible lawyer, had represented 
the court during drafting and was still at the court. What the court 
actually had done was to disregard the rules and thereby set itself 
above the President's statutory authority-and it had done so without 
the minimum judicial candor expected from a court when it feels 
it is right and proper to deviate from an apparently applicable statute 
or regulation. 
Following Tipton, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review 
directly addressed the binding nature of the rules. In United States 
v. Postle'35 the court, in dicta, discussed the potential application to 
the military of the ''good faith exception'' enunciated in United States 
v. Leon.l36 Having first conceded that the text of the Military Rules 
of Evidence excluded that exception and that "to conclude other-
wise is to open a court to attack on the ground that its interpreta-
tion of the law is nothing more than judicial legislation-an exercise 
of power which we believe to be the antithesis of that granted courts 
created under Article I of the United States Constitution . .. [,]" 137 
the court handily found that the "Constitution is a fluid and dynamic 
law'' and that the 
drafters, well aware of this flexibility in the Constitution-and 
the unpredictable vagaries of its interpretation-must have in-
tended that rules of evidence enacted to incorporate the then 
extant constitutional principles on the subjects addressed be 
interpreted with equal flexibility. These "constitutional rules" 
... were intended to keep pace with, and apply to the military, 
the burgeoning body of interpretative constitutional law ... 
not to cast in legal evidentiary concrete the Constitution as it 
was known in 1980.138 
134\Vith his prior knowledge and consent. 
13520 M.J. 632 (N.M.C.R. 1985). 
136468 U.S. 897 {1984). 
131Pr:JstiR, 20 M.J. at 643. 
138Jd. 
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That this attractive and facile statement clearly is wrong is im· 
mediately evident from a review of the text of the rules,13 fJ the 
Analysis, and the post-promulgation history of the rules. 
The rules were written in large measure to supply certai1lty and 
predictability to this critical area of military law. Given the 
worldwide dispersion of the armed forces, the comparative lack of 
legal advice, and the need for consistent procedures throughout the 
armed forces, the drafters-and the President-intentionally set 
much of the Military Rules of Evidence in "concrete."140 The assump· 
tion was that as desirable or binding changes occurred in the con· 
stitutional case law enunciated by the Supreme Court, the Military 
Rules would be amended.141 This already had happened when the 
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review decided Postle; actual-
ly, the court referred to the amendment of the rules to adopt the 
Gates abolition of Aguilar/Spinelli,142 so it obviously was well aware 
of it. Although codification of constitutional law may well be 
desirable in civilian life as well, it is particularly easy to apply in the 
military, given the daily awareness of, and reliance of the armed 
forces on, periodically changed service regulations and directives. 
The services are not in agreement on the binding effect of the rules. 
The Air Force Court of Military Review, for example, !mally has held 
that it is bound by the rules.143 Although infrequent, the Court of 
Military Appeals, however, still is playing fast and loose with the 
rules,144 thus abdicating not only its own judicial responsibilities, but 
also its role as supervisor and "role model" for the subordinate 
military courts. 
139\Vhile concededly the "plain meaning" school of statutory analysts hru. ll!> dtf· 
ficulties, the e.xtraordinarily careful drafting of the rules, insofar as what was ··fixed'' 
and absolute and what was clearly and e.xpressly designed to change with ca.sc law 
makes the Fbstle declaration extraordinarily difficult to accept. When other facton. 
are added-the "legislative" history and the subsequent re\ision history of tht> rul~-lt 
becomes incredible. 
· 
140I note drolly that in the worldwide lectures that Commandt>r J>mnell and I 
presented in 1980 and, I believe, in my 1984 Homer Ferguson Lt>cture, I routinely com· 
mented that we often had "set the rules in concrete" to ensure certainty and 
predictability. 
141Pursuant to DOD Directive 5500.17 (January Hl85). th<' Jotnt St>n·tc<' l'ommtUN• 
on Military Justice is required to perform an annual re\'lew of the ~lanual for Court!>· 
Martial and to forward to the DOD General Counsel's Office proposab for revtsion. 
See general1y Garrett, RRjlecticms au Omtempomry Samn'S qf.\lililary !Au·, Til<' Anny 
Lawyer, Feb. 1987, at 38, 40. This process has worked well, and the ~tanual has been 
amended a number of times as a result. Gilligan & Smith, s11pm note -1-1. at 8S n.-19. 
14220 M.J. at 642. 
143United States v. Johnson, 21 1\f.J. 553, 556-57 (A .F.C.~t.lt HJ&=i) («.'n bane). 
144See United States v. Conner, 27 M.J. 378 (C.M.A. 1989) (discussed supm not<' 66). 
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If one accepts the statement that the Military Rules of Evidence 
are binding and that some courts, including the Court of Military Ap-
peals, are choosing not to follow them, one must ask why judicial 
resistance exists. 
I would posit that the core of judicial resistance to the rules is 
nothing more-or less-than the traditional reluctance of Anglo-
American judges to be bound by statute. Both our legal system and 
our law schools are case oriented.145 The emphasis in law school is 
on understanding precedent and applying it. In the process we all 
too often convey the message that the only limit that exists to case-
and statutory-interpretation is the creativity of the student. 
Students then become lawyers wedded to the adversary system who 
consequently, as zealous advocates, must argue the interpretation 
most favorable to the client, subject only to the slight limitations of 
professional ethics. When counsel ascends to the bench, the entire 
system emphasizes the judge's individual independence and power, 
albeit one usually subject to appellate review. It would hardly be sur-
prising then that many judges would find themselves disinclined to 
take seriously evidentiary rules, particularly unique evidentiary rules 
that limit what was nearly unfettered individual creativity, especially 
if the rules prohibited a result that the court would like to reach. 
The price of judicial noncompliance with the Military Rules of 
Evidence is plain: the appellate courts that are engaging in this not 
so genteel resistance deprive the military criminal legal system of 
its predictability and stability. Of perhaps greater significance, they 
call into question their own legitimacy under the law. 
VIII. THE RULES: APPRAISAL AND FUTURE 
The Military Rules of Evidence are now a fixture of military legal 
practice. Law students who become military lawyers find the eviden-
tiary rules applicable to courts-martial substantially identical with 
the majority rules in force in the United States. Civilian attorneys 
who appear before courts-martial are not hindered by unique, out-
moded, rules easily subject to individual judicial interpretation. 
Perhaps even more important, the creation of the rules gave birth 
to what appears to be a continuing, active, and successful military 
law reform effort. The Military Rules of Evidence have not been 
placed in the Manual for Courts-Martial and abandoned to the ravages 
of time; rather, they have been revised periodically as thought ap-
14
.•Which to some degree' is surprising when one considers the ever in<T(•asing im-
pact not only of statutes but, most especially, of administrative rules. 
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propriate to adopt changes in the law.l46 Even as this article is being 
written, the process is under way to adopt the recent change to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a). 
The periodic spasm of judicial indifference and resistance to the 
rules is troublesome, particularly inasmuch as it sends signals to the 
trial bench. Should it continue, it may undermine the rules in toto. 
At present, however, it might be viewed as occasional obstructions 
on the expressway; that is, the careful driver must take note of the 
hazards and accommodate them, but the speedy progress forward 
usually is not affected significantly. 
The Military Rules of Evidence not only routinely govern trials by 
courts-martial worldwide, but also guide law enforcement person-
nel and commanders in their daily need to protect the rights of 
military personnel while they enforce the law. The apparatus that 
gave rise to the rules continues to function. It has given birth to the 
Rules for Courts-Martial and has assisted in the revision of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. In the future, the military will 
amend the rules as society and law change. The structure behind 
them should ensure a vibrant military legal system at the forefront 
of criminal justice in the United States. Colonel Alley wrought well! 
146Gilligan & Smith, supra note 44, at 85 n..t9; S('(' also 1mpm nott.• l.Jl 
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